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1. Introduction 
 
Recently, there was active argument of the role of official development 
assistance (ODA) in facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (e.g., 
Harms and Lutz 2006; Karakaplan et al. 2005; Kimura and Todo 2010). 
World Bank and IMF have been more interested in understanding whether 
foreign aid inflows from multilateral or bilateral donors have catalyzing 
effect to FDI. ODA and FDI are widely perceived to be alternative manners 
of supplementing domestic savings and promoting economic development in 
developing countries. There are insufficient domestic savings necessary for 
infrastructure investments that support economic growth, indispensable for 
poverty reduction in developing countries. Therefore, foreign aid has become 
an important source of external finance to the developing economics for long 
time. However, the tiring of official development assistance due to financial 
reasons in developed countries leads to contraction in private capital flows to 
developing countries. Private capital as well as foreign direct investments 
needed for sustainable official development assistance. And due to the more 
promotion of open economic policies, FDI has become another source of 
external finance especially after 1980s. Therefore, it is important to look for 
the relationship of ODA and FDI. The purpose of this paper is to provide the 
effects of ODA on FDI inflows to developing countries. 
There is a growing body of literature to show the economic effects of 
foreign aid. The majority of the empirical studies (Burnside and Dollar  
2000; Hansen and Tarp 2001; Dalgaard et al. 2004), we have yet to find any 
robust relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. However, a 
few studies examine the relationship between ODA and private foreign aid 
(e.g., Karakaplan et al. 2005; Harms and Lutz 2006; Kimura and Todo 2010; 
Quazi Rahim M., et al. 2014). However, the literature on the effects of ODA 
on FDI in developing countries has not been fully established yet.  
This study contributes to previous empirical work on the effects of ODA 
on FDI in recipient countries by using newer version of database. It is 
extremely significant to analyze the relations of aid and foreign investment 
using new data, because there are also some countries to graduate from 
recipient country. This study employs panel data with 18 years and 118 
countries. We estimated to employ some econometric methods such as 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) and System GMM (generalized method of 
moments). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
review the literature. The model is specified to include the main 
determinants of FDI in Section3. In Section 4, employing OLS and System 
GMM methods, we give results for the model that governances and area 
dummies are taken into account, in which we examine the relations of aid 
and investment. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Much of the debate on aid has focused on the effect of ODA on economic 
growth and the relationship between aid and savings. However, there are 
very few studies on the effects of the aid on FDI. 
Harms and Lutz (2006) 
The recent study by Harms and Lutz (2006) examine whether or not the 
official aid facilitates private foreign investment inflows in the recipient 
countries, using 1988-1999 panel data from 92 low-income and 
middle-income countries. Harms and Lutz (2006) distinguish foreign aids 
between grants, technical cooperation grants, as well as bilateral and 
multilateral aid and, analyze whether there exists any relationship between 
aid and private foreign investment (sum total of FDI and foreign portfolio 
investment) in developing countries in the 1990s. Harms and Lutz (2006) 
have already controlled for the political and institutional environment by 
using the 6 different measures provided by Kaufmannn et al. (1999), i.e. 
voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, graft. This study finds that the 
aid does not necessary facilitate foreign private investment whether the 
recipient country has good governance system or not.  
Karakaplan et al. (2005) 
Karakaplan et al. (2005) analyzes the effect of aid on FDI, using panel 
data on 97 countries over the period of 1960-2004. Karakaplan et al. (2005) 
includes control variables in their model that account for the 6 different 
measures provided by Kaufmannn et al. (2003). They show that aid does not 
necessary promote FDI inflows into recipient countries. However, if recipient 
country has good governance system, ODA facilitates FDI flows. 
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Kimura and Todo (2006) 
Kimura and Todo (2006) examines the ODA-FDI causal nexus by using 
a ODA donor-recipient country pair data. They use the five largest ODA 
donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, UK, the USA) over the period of 
1995 to 2002. They show that the aid in general does not facilitate FDI 
inflows in recipient countries. This conclusion is consistent with that 
proposed in Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. (2005). They find 
foreign aid does not necessarily promote foreign direct investment in the 
recipient country regardless of governance system. This argument is not 
consistent with Karakaplan et al. (2005). 
 
3. Model and Variable 
 
3.1. Estimation Equation 
 
This section verify the relationship between ODA and FDI using panel data 
from a sample 118 countries for the six intervals 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 
2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and the data covering 118 
countries.  FDI-ODA causal nexus are dynamic in nature and one of the 
advantages of panel data is that they allow the researcher to better 
understand the dynamics of adjustment. Dynamic relationships between 
FDI and ODA are characterized by the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors. We employ the following equation, 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 1i t i t i t i tFDIpc FDIpc ODApc GDP                
_4 , 5 , 1 6 ,i t i t i td GDPpc Openness CPI      
 7 , 8 , , ,i t i t i t i tGovernance Governance ODApc u     .      (1) 
We will assume that the ,i tu  follow a one-way error component model 
, ,i t i i tu    ,                            (2) 
where  20,i IID    and  2, 0,i t IID    independent of each other and 
among themselves. The dynamic panel data regression described in (1) and 
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(2) is characterized by two sources of persistence over time. Autocorrelation 
due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors and 
the country specific fixed effects characterizing the heterogeneity among the 
individuals. 
Subscripts i  and t  denote recipient country and time, respectively. 
The dependent variable ,i tFDIpc  is the natural logarithm of per capita net 
FDI inflows to recipient country i  at time t . The independent variable
,i tODApc  is the natural logarithm of per capita total net ODA inflows to 
recipient country i  at time t . , 1i tGDP   denotes gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the recipient country i  at time 1t  . _ ,i td GDPpc  denotes the 
difference of the natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product 
( ,i tGDPpc ) of the recipient country i  at time t . The small changes in the 
natural logarithm of per capita GDP are directly interpretable as percentage 
changes, that is the growth of per capita GDP, to a very close approximation. 
, 1i tOpenness   denotes the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product of the recipient country i  at 
time 1t  . ,i tCPI  denotes the inflation as measured by the consumer price 
index of the recipient country i  at time t . ,i tGovernance  denotes the quality 
of governance provided by Kaufmann et al. (2015). We use six aggregate 
indicators in Kaufmann et al. (2015), (e.g., voice and Accountability; political 
stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory 
quality; rule of law; control of corruption). , ,i t i tGovernance ODApc  denotes 
the interaction terms among two variables. i  denotes the country-specific 
fixed effects giving place to regional dummy variables (e.g., East Asia & 
Pacific( 1D ); Europe & Central Asia( 2D ); Middle East & North Africa( 3D ); 
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South Asia( 4D ); Sub-Saharan Africa( 5D )). ,i t  denotes the error term with 
 , 0i tE    for all i  and t . 
     
3.2. Variables 
 
FDI 
We explain the expected signs of the variables in equation (1). The dependent 
variable ,i tFDIpc  is the natural logarithm of per capita net FDI inflows from 
all countries to the host country. In the previous studies, while Kimura and 
Todo (2010) and Harms and Lutz (2006) use the log of FDI stock as a 
dependent variable, Karakaplan et al. (2005) use the share of FDI in GDP. 
Among the independent variables, we conduct statistical testing of total net 
ODA from all countries to the recipient country. The set of 118 countries in 
the data is simply chosen from the World Development Indicator 2015.  
 
GDP 
GDP is used as a proxy variable for market size of the host country. The 
GDP data are provided by World Development Indicator 2015. Many 
previous researches use GDP as a control variable for market size in the 
estimation equation. However, on the other hand, Karakaplan et al. (2005) 
employ the growth rate in the real GDP. The relationship between market 
size and investment environment shows a positive trend. Therefore, the 
expected sign of GDP is positive.  
The growth of per capita GDP is used as a measure of economic 
development. Harms and Lutz (2006) employ per capita GDP level as a 
control variable for economic development in estimation equation. Given the 
same circumstances, the relationship between high growth and economic 
development depicts a positive tendency. Economic development attracts 
foreign investment to the host country. Therefore, the expected sign of the 
growth of per capita GDP will be positive. 
 
Openness 
Openness variable represents the degree of openness in the trade policy 
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and calculated as the share of trade in GDP. Harms and Lutz (2006) and 
Karakaplan et al. (2005) add it as a control variable. The relationship 
between openness and private investment shows a positive trend because 
foreign investment firms tend to use the host country as an export-base to 
home or third country. The expected sign of the openness will be positive. 
The data source of openness is the World Development Indicator 2015. 
 
CPI 
CPI represents the consumer price index and is used as a measure of 
investment risk. Under the same circumstances is a higher value of this 
variable, the degree of risk for foreign investors indicates a higher. The 
expected sign of the CPI will be negative. The data source of openness is the 
World Development Indicator 2015. 
 
Governance 
The governance quality is used as a proxy variable for the marginal 
effect of the capital of the host country. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators provided by Kaufmannn et al. (2015) are constructed using 
unobserved components and are measured in units ranging between -2.5 and 
+2.5 inclusive. Giving the same circumstances a higher value of this variable, 
the marginal return on capital for foreign investors indicates a higher. The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators capture six key dimensions of governance 
(e.g., voice and Accountability; political stability and absence of violence; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of 
corruption). In the correlation coefficients test, the correlations are high. 
Therefore in this paper, two or more governance indicators were not used at 
the same estimation. The sign of the governance is expected to be positive 
because the marginal effect of the capital will be low under bad governance.  
We conduct statistical testing of the interaction terms between governance 
and ODA per capita following Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. 
(2005). The sign of the interaction terms is expected to be positive if ODA 
promote FDI inflows to recipient countries under good governance. 
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3.3. Estimation Method 
 
Orthogonality Assumption 
We employ two different estimation methods OLS and System GMM. We 
start with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation using robust standard 
errors. The OLS estimators are consistent only when all regressors are 
orthogonal to the error term. However, there are two reasons why the 
orthogonality assumption may not hold in our FDI regression.  
 
Endogeneity 
The first reason is because there is likely to be a correlation between 
foreign aid and the shocks affecting FDI. The second reason is because there 
is likely to be a correlation between foreign aid and the country specific fixed 
effects. 
Endogeneity can arise as a result of a loop of causality between the 
independent and dependent variables of a model. Endogeneity leads to a 
biased OLS estimate. The fact is known that OLS estimators are very 
different from estimators correcting for endogeneity (e.g., Hansen and Tarp 
2001; Burnside and Dollar 2000).  
 
System GMM 
Therefore, in order to correct for biases arising from endogeneity, we 
employ the system generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). In the system GMM estimation, we 
use lagged differences of ,i tFDIpc  as instruments for equations in levels 
(equation (1)), in addition to lagged levels of ,i tFDIpc  as instruments for 
equations in first differences of equation (1). The reason why the lagged 
regressors can be used as instruments is that they are predetermined and 
thus should not be correlated with the contemporaneous error term. We 
apply the two-step procedure to the system GMM estimation to obtain larger 
efficiency. This can make two-step robust more efficient than one-step robust. 
In addition, we use Windmeijer’s (2005) methodology to obtain robust 
standard errors. The estimator thus obtained is consistent even in the 
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presence of heteroskedasticity and corrects for finite sample biases found in 
the two-step estimations. We test whether instruments are orthogonal to the 
error term using the Hansen j statistic. And we conduct statistical testing 
whether the error term is auto-correlated using the Arellano-Bond statistic. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
ODA and Governance 
Table 1-6 presents the results on whether the FDI net inflows from all 
countries to the recipient country is dependent on total net ODA from all 
countries in the recipient country. The coefficient of the aid variable is 
positive and significant using OLS method. Although, results using system 
GMM method show that the isolated effect of the aid variable is not 
significant except in the case of using the governance indicator of regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness to control for the institutional 
environment. This means that ODA does not necessarily facilitate the 
foreign investment. This result is consistent with Kimura and Todo (2010), 
Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. (2005).  
And we find that the coefficient of the governance variable is positive and 
significant except for using political stability and absence of violence in the 
case method of OLS. But, the coefficient of the governance variable is 
positive and not significant except for using rule of law in the case method of 
system GMM. This result means that good governance does not necessarily 
facilitate the foreign investment. This result is consistent with Kimura and 
Todo (2010) and Harms and Lutz (2006). Where, Harms and Lutz (2006) 
show that the coefficient of the governance variable are positive and 
statistically significant using only government effectiveness and Graft.  
Furthermore, we find that the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between governance and ODA per capita are in general ambiguous. Based on 
the empirical evidence of this paper, it is possible to conclude that FDI does 
not necessarily flow to countries under good governance. This result is 
consistent with Kimura and Todo (2010), but is not consistent with 
Karakaplan et al. (2005). Karakaplan et al. (2005) show that ODA promote 
FDI inflows to the recipient country under good governance. 
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Other control variables 
Results on other control variables are as following. We find that the 
coefficient of the lagged variable of FDI is positive and significant as with 
many previous researches in system GMM method. This mean that FDI on 
the previous period is a higher value, FDI on this period indicates a higher.  
The recipient country’s GDP and the growth of per capita GDP have a 
positive and significant effect on FDI inflows to the recipient country in both 
methods. These results are consistent with recent studies.  
Openness is positive and significant in the case using OLS method. 
While using system GMM, openness is positive but not significant except for 
using the governance indicator of regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness and control of corruption to control for the institutional 
environment. This means that openness does not necessarily attract foreign 
investment. This result is not consistent with Harms and Lutz (2006) and 
Karakaplan et al. (2005). They show that openness is positive and significant. 
Furthermore, we find that the effect of CPI on FDI is ambiguous in both 
method. This means that CPI does not affect the behavior of foreign 
investors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The previous empirical studies investigate the causal nexus between official 
aid and private foreign investment for a long time. This paper examines the 
relationships between ODA and FDI which have recently received attention. 
We consider values for the six intervals 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, 
2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and the data covering 118 countries. In 
other words, this study investigates whether or not FDI inflows from all 
countries is affected by recipient country’s total net ODA. Also, this study 
analyzes how governance quality of the recipient country enhances the role 
of ODA in facilitating FDI inflows to the recipient country.  
The findings of this study show the following three points. First, verify 
that the isolated effect of ODA on FDI is in general insignificant. This result 
is consistent with Kimura and Todo (2010) and Harms and Lutz (2006), but 
not with Karakaplan et al. (2005). Karakaplan et al. (2005) point out that the 
role of ODA does not facilitate the foreign investment. Secondly, show that 
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the isolated effect of governance does not enhance the ODA effect on FDI 
except for countries in which private agents face higher values of rule of law.  
Where, Harms and Lutz (2006) show that the coefficient of the 
governance variable are positive and statistically significant using only 
government effectiveness and graft. Thirdly, point out that the coefficient of 
the interaction terms between governance and aid variable is ambiguous 
This means that the aid does not facilitate foreign private investment even if 
the recipient country has good governance system. This result gives similar 
result to Harms and Lutz (2006). Harms and Lutz (2006) show that the 
coefficient of the interaction terms is negative and statistically significant 
using only regulatory burden. But, our result is not consistent with 
Karakaplan et al. (2005).  
We would like to examine the donor-recipient country pair relationship 
using matching data between Japan and developing countries for future 
research.    
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Data Appendix 
  
We employ data from the following sources: World Developing Indicator 2015, 
Kaufmann et al. (2015). 
 
1) Net foreign direct investment inflows ( FDIpc ): Foreign direct investment 
refers to direct investment equity flows in the reporting economy. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other capital. Direct 
investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a 
resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of influence on 
the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy. 
Ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock is the 
criterion for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank(2015). 
 
2) Net total ODA inflows (ODApc ) : Net official development assistance (ODA) 
per capita consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms 
(net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral 
institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development 
and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients; 
and is calculated by dividing net ODA received by the midyear population 
estimate. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Source: World Bank(2015). 
 
3) Nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP ): GDP at purchaser's prices is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few 
countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively 
applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion 
factor is used. Source: World Bank(2015). 
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4) Nominal Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc ): GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Source: World Bank(2015). 
 
5) Degree of Openness (Openness ): Trade is the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. Source: 
World Bank(2015). 
 
6) Inflation rate (CPI ): Inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Source: World Bank(2015). 
 
7) Governance indicators (Governance ):  
①Voice and Accountability: Voice and accountability captures perceptions of 
the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2015). 
②Political Stability and Absence of Violence: Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Source: 
Kaufmann et al. (2015). 
③Government Effectiveness: Government effectiveness captures perceptions 
of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2015). 
④Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Source: 
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Kaufmann et al. (2015). 
⑤Rule of Law: Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Source: Kaufmann et al. 
(2015). 
⑥Control of Corruption: Control of corruption captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2015). 
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Table 1: The effects of ODA on FDI with regulatory quality 
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Table 2: The effects of ODA on FDI with voice and accountability 
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Table 3: The effects of ODA on FDI with political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism 
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Table 4: The effects of ODA on FDI with government effectiveness 
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Table 5: The effects of ODA on FDI with rule of law 
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Table 6: The effects of ODA on FDI with control of corruption 
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Table 7: The effects of ODA 
 Dependent 
Variable 
①ODA 
(isolated effect) 
②Governance 
(isolated effect)
Interaction 
terms(①×②) 
Harms and 
Lutz (2006) 
FDI inflows per 
capita 
positive and in 
general not 
significant except 
for using 
regulatory burden
positive and in 
general not 
significant 
using 
government 
effectiveness 
and Graft 
negative and in 
general not 
significant 
except for 
using 
regulatory 
burden 
Kimura 
and Todo 
(2006) 
FDI inflows Ambiguous signs 
and not 
significant 
Ambiguous 
signs and not 
significant 
positive and  
not significant 
Karakaplan 
et al. 
(2005). 
the share of FDI 
in GDP 
negative and 
significant 
 positive and 
significant 
Koyama 
and 
Jen(2015) 
FDI inflows per 
capita 
positive and in 
general not 
significant except 
for using 
regulatory quality 
and government 
effectiveness 
positive and in 
general not 
significant 
except for 
using rule of 
law  
Ambiguous 
signs and not 
significant  
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Table 8: Sample Countries 
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Table 9: The change of per capita ODA provided  
 
(Source: OECD internet database)  
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Table 10: Net ODA received per capita in developing countries 
 
(Source: the World Development Indicator 2015) 
 
Table 11: Net FDI received per capita in developing countries 
 
(Source: the World Development Indicator 2015) 
 
  
25 
 
 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Table 13: Correlation Coefficients 
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